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This paper theorizes that relatively poor firm performance 
can prompt chief executive officers (CEOs) to seek more 
advice from executives of other firms who are their 
friends or similar to them and less advice from acquain- 
tances or dissimilar others and suggests how and why 
this pattern of advice seeking could reduce firms' propen- 
sity to change corporate strategy in response to poor per- 
formance. We test our hypotheses with large-sample sur- 
vey data on the identities of CEOs' advice contacts and 
archival data on firm performance and corporate strategy. 
The results confirm our hypotheses and show that execu- 
tives' social network ties can influence firms' responses 
to economic adversity, in particular by inhibiting strategic 
change in response to relatively poor firm performance. 
Additional findings indicate that CEOs' advice seeking in 
response to low performance may ultimately have nega- 
tive consequences for subsequent performance, suggest- 
ing how CEOs' social network ties could play an indirect 
role in organizational decline and downward spirals in 
firm performance.0 
A number of interconnected literatures have sought to 
explain the robust finding from research in organization stud- 
ies and strategic management that top executives often do 
not initiate significant changes in corporate strategy in 
response to poor firm performance and, paradoxically, may 
adhere even more firmly to current strategies in response to 
performance problems. A central theme in much of this liter- 
ature is that systematic biases or "perceptual distortions" 
among top managers are at least partly responsible for strate- 
gic inertia in the face of poor performance (Starbuck, Greve, 
and Hedberg, 1978: 113; Whetten, 1980, 1987; Hambrick 
and D'Aveni, 1988; for a review, see Barker and Duhaime, 
1997). Top managers are thought to overattribute poor perfor- 
mance to external factors, such as a competitive industry 
environment, and underattribute performance problems to 
weaknesses in their current strategy, even when competitors 
have performed better under the same industry conditions. 
Threat-rigidity theory suggests that stress brought on by poor 
performance prompts executives to reduce information pro- 
cessing activity, which decreases their consideration of 
strategic alternatives (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; 
Sutton, 1990). This restriction in information processing is 
attributed in part to the centralization of decision making in 
response to poor performance and an associated decrease in 
communication between lower-level managers and top exec- 
utives. The organizational decline literature also associates 
strategic inertia with centralized decision-making processes 
(Whetten, 1987). But empirical research has provided mixed 
support for these propositions. Large-sample studies of let- 
ters to shareholders and other corporate communications, as 
well as qualitative studies of organizations in decline, have 
provided evidence for managers' attribution biases and 
restricted consideration of strategic alternatives during peri- 
ods of poor performance (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 
1978; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; D'Aveni and MacMillan, 
1990; Barker and Barr, 2002). There is less evidence that cen- 
tralized decision making contributes to strategic inertia in 
response to poor performance (Cameron, Whetten, and Kim, 
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1987; D'Aveni, 1989; Barker and Mone, 1998). While this lit- 
erature has significantly advanced our understanding of 
strategic inertia by demonstrating how managers' cognitions 
can help explain firms' responses (or lack thereof) to eco- 
nomic adversity, important gaps in our understanding of this 
phenomenon remain. Especially noteworthy is that there has 
been little consideration of how micro-social factors may con- 
tribute to strategic inertia. In particular, despite the recent 
explosion of interest in how social networks can influence 
corporate policy (e.g., Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Davis and 
Greve, 1997; Ingram and Roberts, 2000), there has been little 
research on the role that executives' social networks might 
play in shaping firms' strategic responses to poor perfor- 
mance (cf. Kraatz, 1998) as they seek advice through their 
social interactions with other top managers that will give 
them qualitative assessments of current firm strategy. 
Research on strategic decision making and executive scan- 
ning has shown that executives assign greater weight to 
information and advice from personal sources, such as infor- 
mal conversations with colleagues, than to impersonal 
sources, such as written reports and recommendations or 
the output of management information systems, in making 
strategic decisions (Aguilar, 1967; Mintzberg, 1973; Daft, Sor- 
munen, and Parks, 1988; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Elenkov, 1997). This literature would suggest that advice- 
seeking interactions with colleagues may have a significant 
influence on chief executive officers' decisions about 
whether to modify strategy in response to performance prob- 
lems. 
Moreover, social psychological research on belief persever- 
ance suggests how CEOs' advice seeking in response to 
poor firm performance may contribute to the previously 
noted biases in managers' perceptions that have been impli- 
cated in strategic inertia and organizational decline. A large 
body of research has shown that people often persevere in 
their beliefs even when the evidential basis for those beliefs 
has been largely disconfirmed, consistent with research on 
organizational decline and threat rigidity, suggesting that 
executives' confidence in their strategies often persists 
despite negative performance outcomes (Nisbett and Ross, 
1980; Anderson and Kellam, 1992). Such belief perseverance 
has been shown to result not only from biased assimilation 
of available evidence but also from biased search for informa- 
tion and opinion (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Carretta and More- 
land, 1982; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983; Schulz- 
Hardt et al., 2000). Research in this literature has shown that 
when people's beliefs are challenged, they tend to seek infor- 
mation from sources that are likely to affirm those beliefs, 
particularly personal sources of information, and avoid 
sources that are more likely to disconfirm those beliefs 
(Swann, 1996). Recent theoretical interpretations of these 
findings have invoked self-categorization theory (Hogg and 
Terry, 2000), suggesting that uncertainty created by evidence 
that calls one's preexisting beliefs into question may result in 
increased information seeking from in-group members who 
are likely to provide points of view that affirm those beliefs. 
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CEOs' Advice Networks 
The uncertainty that results from relatively poor firm perfor- 
mance may prompt CEOs to seek more advice from execu- 
tives at other firms whom they would categorize as in-group 
members because they share a common professional back- 
ground, friendship ties, or employment in the same industry. 
Evidence from related social psychological and social network 
research indicates that these in-group managers are especial- 
ly likely to offer information and points of view that affirm 
CEOs' preexisting strategic beliefs, defined as their beliefs 
about what firm strategies are likely to succeed given prevail- 
ing environmental demands. CEOs' strategic beliefs are likely 
to be instantiated to a significant degree in their firms' cur- 
rent strategies (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), and when 
executives' advice seeking restores their confidence in the 
correctness of their strategic beliefs, they will be less likely 
to change firm strategy. In the study presented here, we use 
survey data on top executives' advice-seeking interactions to 
help explain strategic inertia in response to relatively poor 
firm performance, thus providing insight into the role that 
executives' social networks could play in firms' strategic 
responses to economic adversity. 
CEOS' ADVICE NETWORKS AND FIRMS' STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO POOR PERFORMANCE 
Recent social psychological theorizing about human motiva- 
tion points to the desire to render the environment under- 
standable and predictable as among the most basic drivers of 
individual cognition and behavior (Stevens and Fiske, 1995; 
Fiske, 2000), primarily because understanding serves the 
even more basic need to exercise control over personally 
important outcomes (Pittman, 1998). We use the term "sub- 
jective uncertainty" to refer to the psychological state that 
exists when an individual is "confronted with an experience 
that calls his or her conceptualizations into question, that 
implies that his or her understanding of the world is inade- 
quate ..." (Pittman and D'Agostino, 1985: 120; cf. Hogg and 
Abrams, 1993; Hogg and Mullin, 1999). Because subjective 
uncertainty suggests a reduced capacity to control important 
outcomes, it evokes psychological distress and negative 
affect (e.g., anxiety), and this activates a deep-seated motive 
to restore a homeostatic level of certainty and perceived con- 
trol (Pittman and Heller, 1987). Evidence suggests that peo- 
ple pursue a wide range of cognitive and behavioral strate- 
gies in an effort to reestablish a sense of certainty and 
control (Greenberger and Strasser, 1991). To the extent that 
CEOs' judgments and beliefs about strategy are reflected to 
some degree in their firm's current corporate strategy (see 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), poor performance will 
reduce a CEO's confidence in the veracity of his or her 
beliefs about strategic cause-and-effect relationships and 
prompt efforts to reduce uncertainty. In suggesting that poor 
performance raises CEOs' subjective uncertainty about their 
strategic beliefs, however, we are assuming neither that poor 
performance discredits CEOs' beliefs and assumptions about 
strategy with absolute certainty, given inherent ambiguity in 
determining the effect of corporate strategy on firm perfor- 
mance (Pfeffer, 1981), nor that the determinants of poor per- 
formance are so ambiguous that CEOs can completely dis- 
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count the negative feedback. Under such circumstances, 
CEOs would become more uncertain about their strategic 
beliefs following poor performance and yet could be reas- 
sured about those beliefs through interacting with other man- 
agers. 
Confirming Beliefs through the Advice Network 
Self-categorization theory-which focuses on the determi- 
nants and consequences of an individual's mental representa- 
tion of self in terms of memberships in relevant social cate- 
gories or groups-suggests that the significant uncertainty 
that CEOs experience when their firms are performing poorly 
will promote in-group identification and related in-group bias- 
es. These, in turn, function to increase CEOs' reliance on 
advice from executives with whom they share a common 
functional background (i.e., finance, marketing, etc.), friend- 
ship ties, or employment in the same industry. People can 
base their identification with categorically similar others on a 
wide range of social attributes (Sherman, Hamilton, and 
Lewis, 1999), and recent research suggests that people are 
especially likely to identify with others in terms of a salient 
social category when they are experiencing substantial sub- 
jective uncertainty (Hogg and Abrams, 1993; Grieve and 
Hogg, 1999). In-group identification is thought to provide 
broad uncertainty reduction benefits because the cognitive 
processes associated with identification involve self-stereo- 
typing one's own beliefs in terms of a set of beliefs that are 
presumed to be consensually validated by other in-group 
members. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated 
that people identify more strongly with contextually relevant 
in-groups when they experience uncertainty about personally 
relevant issues (Mullin and Hogg, 1998, 1999; see Hogg and 
Mullin, 1999, for a review). 
This general line of argument suggests that when CEOs are 
experiencing substantial uncertainty about strategy-related 
beliefs as a result of poor firm performance, they will be 
more aware of social category differences and identify more 
intensely with other executives with whom they share a 
salient category. In this study, we examine three attributes 
likely to provide a basis for in-group identification among cor- 
porate executives: shared functional backgrounds, friendship 
ties, and employment in the same industry. First, a number 
of studies have provided evidence that functional background 
can provide a salient basis for in-group categorization (i.e., 
categorization as a finance person, marketing person, etc.). 
There is evidence that in-group biases from common func- 
tional backgrounds influence the selection of top managers 
and outside directors, and similarity in the functional back- 
grounds of CEOs and board members has also been shown 
to bias the evaluation of executive performance and to pro- 
mote inclusiveness in strategic decision-making processes 
(Useem and Karabel, 1986; Fligstein, 1987; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995; for a review, see Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
Qualitative work on corporate governance also suggests that 
top executives and directors routinely invoke functional back- 
ground in describing one another in response to open-ended 
questions about their peers (Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). 
Friendship ties, especially those perceived as such, also pro- 
4/ASQ, March 2003 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:03:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CEOs' Advice Networks 
vide a primary basis for social categorization among execu- 
tives. When asked to assess their relationship with other 
managers, executives routinely categorize their peers as 
either friends or acquaintances (Mace, 1971; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992). Moreover, a central tenet of the friendship 
literature is that people are more likely to identify psychologi- 
cally with friends than with acquaintances or strangers, not 
only because friendship indicates a range of similarities in 
beliefs and attitudes (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Suitor and 
Keeton, 1997) but also because friends are normatively 
expected to identify with each other (Allan, 1979). Research 
has also shown that executives categorize each other accord- 
ing to their primary industry of employment (Lorsch, 1989; 
Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Porac, Wade, and Pollock, 1999). 
Porac et al. (1989) demonstrated that employment in the 
same industry provides an important basis for social identifi- 
cation among managers, and Westphal and Milton (2000) pro- 
vided evidence that individuals' primary industry of employ- 
ment is a salient basis for in-group identification among 
corporate directors. 
Biases in Advice Seeking 
Research on the cognitive consequences of in-group identifi- 
cation indicates that the elevation in identification strength 
that results from performance-induced uncertainty will 
increase the extent to which CEOs manifest a number of 
positive biases in their perceptions of these in-group member 
executives (Brewer and Brown, 1998). We expect that these 
biases will have substantive implications for whom CEOs 
choose to seek out and rely on for advice and information, 
increasing their reliance on the advice and counsel of in- 
group member executives. 
At the broadest level, an increase in identification strength 
will heighten a focal actor's social attraction to, and general 
preference for social interaction with, in-group members 
(Hogg and Mullin, 1999). While people in general prefer to 
interact with similar others, individuals who manifest an 
especially high level of identification with in-group members 
will display a stronger preference for interacting with them. 
Thus, to the extent that CEOs of poorly performing firms 
identify more strongly with in-group executives at other firms 
than do CEOs not experiencing poor performance, they will 
manifest more positive attitudes toward those executives 
and will interact with and seek advice from them with greater 
frequency. 
Increases in identification strength associated with uncertain- 
ty will also increase the perceived diagnosticity and validity of 
the expressed positions of in-group members. Social psycho- 
logical research on in-group biases in evaluation processes 
suggests that in-group members are seen as having greater 
expertise than out-group members (Brewer and Brown, 
1998), and studies of social influence indicate that in-group 
members' views are more persuasive than out-group mem- 
bers' views because they are considered to be more valid 
(van Knippenberg, 1999). Thus, CEOs who are strongly identi- 
fied with in-group executives because they are experiencing 
high subjective uncertainty will manifest a greater tendency 
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than CEOs experiencing less uncertainty to exaggerate the 
diagnosticity of in-group executives' views and therefore 
should display a greater propensity to seek advice from those 
executives. 
Finally, increases in identification associated with subjective 
uncertainty will elevate people's tendency to exaggerate the 
degree to which in-group members offer perspectives that 
affirm their views (Hogg and Mullin, 1999). People generally 
prefer to interact with others whose views support their own 
(e.g., Swann, 1996). But because an uncertain individual will 
be especially likely to overstate the extent to which in-group 
members support his or her views, he or she should display 
a greater propensity to seek out the views of in-group mem- 
bers than will individuals who are not experiencing elevated 
levels of uncertainty. Thus, CEOs of poorly performing firms 
should be especially likely to exaggerate the extent to which 
in-group member executives affirm their beliefs about strate- 
gy and, consequently, will seek out the views of in-group 
members with greater frequency. 
Taken together with prior discussion indicating that subjective 
uncertainty from poor performance should increase a CEO's 
tendency to identify with executives of other firms who 
share functional backgrounds, friendship ties, and employ- 
ment in the same industry, our theoretical argument sug- 
gests the following formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis la (Hla): CEOs of firms with relatively poor perfor- 
mance will seek more advice from executives of other firms who 
have similar functional backgrounds and less advice from executives 
of other firms who do not have similar functional backgrounds than 
do CEOs of firms with relatively high performance. 
Hypothesis lb (Hlb): CEOs of firms with relatively poor perfor- 
mance will seek more advice from executives of other firms with 
whom they share personal friendship ties and less advice from 
executives of other firms with whom they do not share personal 
friendship ties than do CEOs of firms with relatively high perfor- 
mance. 
Hypothesis ic (H1c): CEOs of firms with relatively poor perfor- 
mance will seek more advice from executives of other firms in the 
same industry and less advice from executives of other firms in dif- 
ferent industries than do CEOs of firms with relatively high perfor- 
mance. 
CEO Advice Networks and Firm Strategic Change 
Consistent with past theory and research in the top manage- 
ment literature, we assume that corporate strategies come 
to reflect the strategic assumptions and beliefs of top execu- 
tives in two ways: a CEO's beliefs obviously influence corpo- 
rate strategy when he or she is directly involved in formulat- 
ing or revising the strategy, but the CEO can also become 
socialized into belief systems that endorse the corporate 
strategy through direct social influence from other top man- 
agers and board members who were involved in formulating 
the strategy (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990, 1996). When a firm is performing poorly, 
however, a CEO is likely to seek advice on the firm's strategy 
from those in his or her advice network, which is likely to be 
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CEOs' Advice Networks 
reflected in the firm's strategic change or lack of change. 
Thus, who the CEO consults is important, particularly if the 
CEO is seeking affirmation of current strategy. Evidence from 
micro-sociological, social psychological, and management 
research indicates that executives of other firms with whom 
a focal CEO shares a similar functional background, friend- 
ship ties, and industry of employment are especially likely to 
provide affirming views on corporate strategy. 
Functional background similarity. There is substantial evi- 
dence suggesting that firm executives who share a focal 
CEO's functional background will be particularly likely to sup- 
port his or her strategic judgments. According to upper eche- 
lon theorists, managers who share a functional background 
develop common schemata or beliefs pertinent to strategic 
decision making (Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Beyer et al., 
1997), causing them to diagnose strategic issues in a similar 
way and to favor related solutions (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Waller, Huber, and Glick, 1995). Several studies have 
shown a relationship between the functional background of 
top managers and corporate strategy, including diversification 
(Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987; Smith and White, 1987; Hitt 
and Tyler, 1991; Fligstein and Brantley, 1992). There is evi- 
dence that managers with a finance background are more 
likely than managers with another functional background to 
favor strategies that reduce product market risk or geograph- 
ic market risk (Smith and White, 1987; Fligstein and Brantley, 
1992). Theory and research on social networks also suggests 
that network ties to individuals who are similar on salient 
demographic characteristics, including functional background, 
are more likely to facilitate the exchange of social support, 
whereas ties to dissimilar others tend to facilitate the 
exchange of novel information and perspectives (Ibarra, 
1992). A large literature in social psychology suggests that 
similarity on salient characteristics enhances mutual affect 
(Graves and Powell, 1995), increasing the desire to provide 
social support, and people can more easily empathize with 
contacts who have similar backgrounds (Westphal and Mil- 
ton, 2000), increasing their ability to provide such support. 
Thus, to the extent that affirmation of each other's judgment 
on strategic issues is one element of social support between 
top managers, managers who are similar with respect to 
functional background may be more likely to affirm each 
other's strategic beliefs. 
Friendship ties. Potential advisors who share friendship ties 
with a focal CEO should be especially likely to confirm the 
CEO's strategy-related beliefs. An extensive literature on 
social homophily suggests that people who are personal 
friends tend to be similar across a range of characteristics 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Marsden, 1988; McPherson 
and Smith-Lovin, 1987), including their professional beliefs, 
opinions, and values (Ibarra, 1992; Monge and Contractor, 
1997; Suitor and Keeton, 1997). Thus, compared with 
acquaintances, top managers who are friends should tend to 
have relatively similar opinions about key aspects of corpo- 
rate strategy, such as appropriate levels of product/market 
diversification or geographic diversification. 
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Moreover, friends are normatively expected to provide social 
support, which includes affirming each other's capabilities, 
bolstering each other's confidence, and expressing sympathy, 
especially in difficult times (Allan, 1979; Silver, 1990; Well- 
man and Wortley, 1990; Dugan and Kivett, 1998). Ibarra 
(1995) suggested that in professional contexts, strong social 
ties (e.g., friends) are normatively expected to fulfill psycho- 
social functions that involve enhancing a colleague's sense of 
competence in his or her professional role. In the context of 
top management, this would involve affirming the manager's 
judgment on strategic issues. To violate this norm of friend- 
ship relations is to "put strains on the relationship" (Lazars- 
feld and Merton, 1954: 33). Accordingly, friends should tend 
to affirm each other's self-serving attributions for perfor- 
mance problems. 
Also, friends tend to be more familiar with each other's 
beliefs about important issues than acquaintances are (Allan, 
1979; Dugan and Kivett, 1998). Ingram and Roberts (2000: 
389) suggested that friendship ties between managers of dif- 
ferent firms facilitate awareness of each party's "strategic 
disposition." Such mutual knowledge facilitates efforts to 
affirm each other's strategic beliefs, and over time, mutual 
affirmation of each other's opinions can reinforce actual simi- 
larity in attitudes (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). Cross-cultur- 
al research on friendship also suggests that norms of mutual 
affirmation in friendship relations are especially strong in 
communities with generally high levels of social solidarity, 
such as the community of corporate elites (Cohen, 1961: 
373). Folk wisdom suggests that friends feel compelled to 
give each other honest feedback about their ideas and deci- 
sions. Because friends tend to have similar beliefs and atti- 
tudes, however, this would also lead to mutual affirmation of 
each other's beliefs. Thus, for a variety of reasons, managers 
who are friends of the CEO should be more likely than 
acquaintances to affirm the CEO's beliefs on strategic issues. 
Employment in the same industry. Managers should be 
more likely to affirm each other's views about corporate strat- 
egy if they share the same primary industry of employment. 
There is abundant evidence from multiple literatures, includ- 
ing the literatures on strategic decision making, corporate 
elites, and the social construction of markets, suggesting that 
executives in the same industry share a variety of beliefs and 
assumptions that may influence strategic choices (Huff, 
1982; Spender, 1989; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). 
Research by Porac and colleagues demonstrated that execu- 
tives in the Scottish knitwear industry share certain core 
assumptions about environmental conditions and hold similar 
normative beliefs about how to cope with threats and oppor- 
tunities in the environment (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 
1989; Porac et al., 1995). In a study of top executives in 
three British industries, Spender (1989: 17) identified "an 
altogether surprising degree of homogeneity amongst the 
constructs being applied by managers ... in each industry." 
Sutcliffe and Huber (1998) showed that executives from the 
same industry tend to have relatively similar perceptions of 
such environmental characteristics as munificence, complexi- 
ty, and controllability, perceptions that have been shown to 
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influence strategic choice (Keats and Hitt, 1988). Moreover, 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that managers in the same indus- 
try use similar criteria to evaluate acquisition candidates. 
Spender (1989) characterized widespread beliefs in an indus- 
try about appropriate strategic action as "industry recipes" 
and suggested that they reflect shared experiences and prior 
social interaction among industry executives. An industry is a 
"social setting in which events, trends, and concepts are 
interpreted and shared," resulting in socially constructed 
beliefs and assumptions about strategy (Huff, 1982; Ham- 
brick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993: 405). Thus, given 
the commonality of strategic beliefs within an industry, we 
expect that managers will be more likely to affirm each 
other's views about corporate strategy if they operate in the 
same primary industry. 
The above discussion indicates that advice from managers 
with whom a CEO shares friendship ties, employment in the 
same industry, or similar functional backgrounds will be more 
likely to confirm a CEO's strategic judgments than will advice 
from executives with whom a CEO lacks such connections. 
To the extent that CEOs' strategic judgment and beliefs are 
reflected in the firm's corporate strategy (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996), high levels of advice from these in-group 
member executives should tend to reduce CEOs' doubts 
about the appropriateness of their firms' corporate strategies, 
reducing their propensity to initiate strategic change. Con- 
versely, advice seeking from managers with whom CEOs 
lack social connections may increase the likelihood of initiat- 
ing change. Strategic advice from acquaintances or dissimilar 
others is more likely to provide CEOs with new information 
and different points of view that challenge their assumptions 
about corporate strategy (Granovetter, 1973; Campbell, Mars- 
den, and Hurlbert, 1986; McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic, 
1992), and such contacts are less subject to the norms of 
mutual affirmation discussed above. This line of argument 
can be summarized in the following formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The higher the levels of CEO advice seeking 
from executives of other firms who have a similar functional back- 
ground and the lower the levels of CEO advice seeking from execu- 
tives of other firms who do not have a similar functional back- 
ground, (1) the less subsequent change in corporate strategy and (2) 
the more negative (less positive) the relationship between relatively 
poor firm performance and subsequent change in corporate 
strategy. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The higher the levels of CEO advice seeking 
from executives of other firms with whom the CEO shares personal 
friendship ties and the lower the levels of CEO advice seeking from 
executives of other firms with whom the CEO does not share per- 
sonal friendship ties, (1) the less subsequent change in corporate 
strategy and (2) the more negative (less positive) the relationship 
between relatively poor firm performance and subsequent change in 
corporate strategy. 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The higher the levels of CEO advice seeking 
from executives of other firms in the same industry and the lower 
the levels of CEO advice seeking from executives of other firms in 
different industries, (1) the less subsequent change in corporate 
strategy and (2) the more negative (less positive) the relationship 
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between relatively poor firm performance and subsequent change in 
corporate strategy. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample frame for this study included 600 companies ran- 
domly selected from the Forbes index of the largest industrial 
and service firms. We measured CEO advice seeking with 
data from an original survey questionnaire and the other inde- 
pendent and dependent variables, including firm performance 
and strategic change, with archival data. The survey question- 
naire was sent in January 1999 to all 600 CEOs in the sample 
frame. We took several steps to ensure the highest possible 
response rate to the survey (Linsky, 1975; Groves, Cialdini, 
and Cooper, 1992; Fowler, 1993; Westphal, 1999): (1) feed- 
back from a pretest was used to revise the format of the 
questionnaire and the instructions, making it easier to com- 
plete; (2) we highlighted in the cover letter that the survey 
was part of a continuing research project conducted by facul- 
ty in several major business schools, noting that hundreds of 
their peers had participated in prior surveys; (3) two additional 
waves of questionnaires were sent to nonrespondents, with 
the third wave preceded by an endorsement and appeal for 
participation by directors at a management consulting firm. 
Two hundred and fifty-three CEOs responded, a response 
rate of 42 percent. Data on board interlocks or corporate 
strategy were unavailable for 12 companies, leaving a final 
sample of 241 companies, or 40 percent of the sample 
frame. 
We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test to check 
for nonreponse bias in the survey data. This procedure 
assesses whether the distribution of respondents is different 
from that of nonrespondents for each of the variables mea- 
sured with archival data. The results indicated no significant 
differences between respondents and nonrespondents on 
these variables. The survey sample was representative of the 
sample frame with respect to market-to-book value, product 
market diversification, internationalization, and sources of 
board independence-the portion of the board appointed 
after the CEO, outside director ownership, and institutional 
ownership (these measures are discussed below)-p-values 
ranged from .156 to .828. A difference in proportions test 
also showed that our sample was representative with regard 
to the proportion of boards that have separate CEO and 
board chair positions. Accordingly, there is consistent evi- 
dence that sample selection bias does not threaten the validi- 
ty of our measures. 
We obtained data on ownership, CEO and board characteris- 
tics and the characteristics of CEO contacts from Standard 
and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Execu- 
tives; The Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate 
Management; Who's Who in Finance and Industry; and cor- 
porate proxy statements. Other archival data on firms in the 
sample, including data on firm diversification, international 
operations, and industry membership, came from the PC- 
COMPUSTAT Database and Compact Disclosure. 
10/ASQ, March 2003 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:03:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CEOs' Advice Networks 
Measures 
Advice-seeking interactions. CEOs' advice-seeking interac- 
tions were measured with a multi-item scale in the survey 
questionnaire. Pretest interviews and descriptive findings 
from our survey indicated that when CEOs of the firms in our 
sample sought advice on strategic issues from executives at 
other firms, they typically sought opinions on issues related 
to the suitability of the focal firm's corporate strategy (i.e., 
whether or to what extent the strategy was appropriate or 
required modification). While CEOs also sometimes seek 
advice about implementation of the current strategy, our data 
indicate that advice seeking from managers at other firms on 
such issues is relatively rare and is not the focus of our 
study. We focus on advice ties to top executives at other 
firms (i.e., versus advice seeking from directors or managers 
at the focal firm) because available evidence indicates that 
CEOs are often reluctant to seek advice from their directors 
in response to performance problems, possibly due to 
impression management concerns, for example, concerns 
about disclosing or highlighting possible problems to individu- 
als who are expected to monitor the CEO's performance or 
concerns about appearing uncertain, indecisive, or dependent 
(see Westphal, 1999). Such concerns are less likely to inhibit 
advice seeking from executives at other firms. 
In wording the survey questions, we drew from qualitative 
studies of corporate governance and strategic decision mak- 
ing that suggest how managers themselves describe their 
professional interactions. We refined the survey questions 
based on feedback from a qualitative pretest that involved 
pilot interviews with 23 top managers. The main purpose of 
the interviews was to determine whether respondents inter- 
preted each question as we had expected. We also used 
feedback from the pretest to revise the wording of the ques- 
tions and to modify the instructions and format of the survey. 
The survey scale included three questions to assess the 
respondent's general advice-seeking propensity. Respon- 
dents were asked to assess (1) how many times they had 
sought advice on strategic issues from a top manager at 
another company during the past twelve months; (2) to what 
extent they had sought the opinion of a top manager at 
another company about the firm's current strategy during that 
period; and (3) to what extent they had solicited advice from 
a top manager at another company about the firm's strategic 
options. Top managers were defined as executives above the 
vice-president level (i.e., senior vice-president level and high- 
er), consistent with past studies in the top management 
team literature (e.g., Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987; Ham- 
brick, Cho, and Chen, 1996). For the latter two items, we 
used a conventional 5-point Likert-type format. The reliability 
of this scale was acceptably high (Cronbach's ax = .90). After 
each of these questions, respondents were also asked to 
provide the name(s) of managers at other firms from whom 
they had sought advice or opinions on strategic issues during 
the past twelve months and to indicate the number of times 
they had done so. There was a high level of consistency in 
the number of interactions with specific individuals reported 
for each question in the scale (i.e., over 95 percent of all 
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interactions reported by respondents were reported for each 
of the three questions), which reflects the high alpha coeffi- 
cient for the questions about general advice-seeking 
propensity. 
Given the importance of this measure to our study, we sent 
two sets of follow-up questionnaires to assess interrater reli- 
ability. We sent questionnaires to (1) other inside directors at 
the companies of responding CEOs and (2) top managers list- 
ed as advice contacts by the responding CEOs. Inside direc- 
tors were asked to assess the CEO's advice-seeking tenden- 
cy (e.g., "To what extent has the CEO sought the opinion of 
top managers at other companies about the firm's current 
strategy during the past 12 months?"); top managers whom 
respondents listed as advice contacts were asked to provide 
the name(s) of managers at other firms who had approached 
them for advice on strategic issues during the past twelve 
months and to indicate the number of times they had done 
so. Pretest interviews suggested that CEOs often relay infor- 
mation from conversations with managers at other firms to 
other top managers at the focal firm, particularly inside direc- 
tors. Thus, we expected that inside directors would be 
informed about the CEO's advice-seeking activity. Results of 
the interrater reliability assessment are provided in table 1. 
We compared CEOs' and inside directors' responses by cal- 
culating kappa coefficients for the advice-seeking items. 
Kappa is a correlation coefficient that corrects for the expect- 
ed level of agreement (i.e., chance correlation). According to 
Fleiss (1981), values above .75 indicate excellent agreement 
beyond chance; as shown in the table, kappas exceed .75 for 
all the survey items. The sample for this analysis included all 
companies with a responding CEO and at least one respond- 
ing inside director (N = 168). Similarly, we calculated kappa 
coefficients to assess agreement between CEOs and the top 
Table 1 
Interrater Reliability Assessment 
Survey item Observed Expected Kappa Z* 
Agreement between focal CEO and inside directorst 
In the past twelve months, how many times have you sought 88.19% 26.79% .84 22.31 
advice on strategic issues from a top manager at another 
company?* 
In the past twelve months, to what extent have you sought the 83.54% 25.54% .78 21.16 
opinion of a top manager at another company about the firm's 
current strategy? 
In the past twelve months, to what extent have you solicited 85.23% 24.76% .80 22.32 
advice from a top manager at another company about the 
firm's strategic options? 
Agreement between focal CEO and top managers listed as advice contacts' 
Number of times the CEO sought advice from particular top 92.54% 60.03% .81 28.52 
managers at other companies during the past twelve months. 
* Z statistics for all kappas are statistically significant. 
t N = 168. The phrasing of this question is taken from the CEO survey. The phrasing was altered appropriately for the 
survey of inside directors. 
* To calculate a kappa for this item, we divided the number of interactions into quintiles. 
' N = 605. For this item, CEOs listed particular top managers from whom they had sought advice, and individuals from 
this list indicated particular top managers who had approached them for advice. 
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managers whom they listed as advice contacts about the 
number of times the CEO approached them for advice in the 
previous year. As shown in table 1, the kappa coefficient was 
acceptably high (.81). The sample for this analysis included all 
managers listed as advice contacts by the CEO who respond- 
ed to the survey (N = 605). Respondents were not signifi- 
cantly different from nonrespondents with respect to their 
functional background, friendship status with the CEO (as 
reported by the CEO), or being in the same industry as the 
CEO. 
Following Hambrick and Mason (1984), we divided functional 
background into three categories: throughput functions (i.e., 
operations, engineering, or research and development), out- 
put functions (i.e., marketing or sales), and peripheral func- 
tions such as finance and law. We coded employment in the 
same industry as 1 if the CEO and the CEO's advice contact 
worked as full-time executives in an industry with the same 
primary, two-digit Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC) 
code. Porac, Wade, and Pollock (1999) provided evidence 
that corporate leaders routinely categorize firms on the basis 
of primary, two-digit SIC codes (see also Antle and Smith, 
1986). 
To assess friendship ties between CEOs and their advice 
contacts, respondents were asked to consider their personal 
relationship with each manager listed as an advice contact 
and to indicate whether they considered each person to be 
an acquaintance or a friend. Prompting respondents to distin- 
guish between acquaintances and friends permits a more 
precise measure of perceived friendship (cf. Allan, 1979; 
Segal, 1979). This approach to measuring friendship is com- 
mon in the social network literature (e.g., Brass, 1984; Krack- 
hardt, 1992). Moreover, this measure of friendship was highly 
correlated with two other questions that assessed the 
strength or closeness of the CEOs' relationships with their 
advice contacts (cf. Burt, 1992). To assess interrater reliabili- 
ty, the CEOs' advice contacts were asked to consider their 
personal relationship with each person who had approached 
them for advice on strategic issues during the past twelve 
months. A separate analysis showed a high level of agree- 
ment (94 percent) between CEOs and responding advice 
contacts about the status of their relationship as friends vs. 
acquaintances. We then created six count variables to indi- 
cate the number of times (in the past year) that the focal 
CEO had sought strategic advice from managers at other 
companies who (1) had a similar functional background to the 
CEO, (2) had a different functional background to the CEO, 
(3) were friends of the CEO, (4) were not friends of the CEO, 
(5) were in the same industry as the CEO, or (6) were not in 
the same industry as the CEO. 
Firm performance. We operationalized firm performance as 
market-to-book value of equity, measured at the end of the 
year prior to the survey date. In separate analyses, we mea- 
sured performance as return on assets, and the general pat- 
tern of results reported below was unchanged. Theories of 
organizational change generally presume that managers react 
to deviations in performance from some expected level 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 1998), and performance 
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expectations are routinely influenced by the performance of 
industry firms. Thus, we adjusted performance for the aver- 
age market-to-book value among all firms in the industry over 
the prior three-year period. Separate analyses confirmed that 
the results were nearly identical when prior industry perfor- 
mance was measured over shorter or longer time periods 
(e.g., two or five years) or using an unadjusted measure of 
performance. The results were also robust to dichotomous 
indicators of poor performance (e.g., adjusted market-to-book 
value less than the median value or less than one standard 
deviation below the mean). The continuous variable effective- 
ly indicates the extent to which performance is poor. Follow- 
ing prior studies on top management and strategic change, 
we operationalized poor performance using a continuous 
measure (e.g., Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Boeker, 1992; Boek- 
er and Goodstein, 1993; Ocasio, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 
1996). We tested interactions between firm performance and 
advice-seeking interactions using the product-term approach, 
with component variables centered to avoid multicollinearity. 
Change in corporate strategy We assessed two dimensions 
of corporate strategy: product market diversification and geo- 
graphic diversification. These dimensions, while not exhaus- 
tive, capture important aspects of a firm's corporate strategy 
and have been widely studied in the strategy literature. To 
increase the generalizability of our findings, we examined 
change in both dimensions of diversification. 
We operationalized product market diversification using the 
entropy measure (Palepu, 1985). Hoskisson et al. (1993) pro- 
vided evidence for the convergent, discriminant, and criteri- 
on-related validity of this measure. We operationalized geo- 
graphic diversification using a composite measure that 
includes three components: foreign sales, calculated as a 
percentage of total sales; foreign production, measured as 
foreign assets divided by total assets; and geographic disper- 
sion, which indicates the number of country subsidiaries, cal- 
culated as a percentage of the highest value in the sample. 
We summed the three variables to form a composite mea- 
sure. Prior research has shown acceptable reliability for the 
component variables (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001), and 
we found similarly high reliability in our sample (alpha = .89). 
We measured (absolute) change in product market diversifi- 
cation and geographic diversification over the two-year period 
following the survey date (change in product market/ 
geographic diversification). A two-year time period captures 
change in firms with relatively protracted decision-making 
processes (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) while still reflecting 
the influence of managers' advice ties at the time of the sur- 
vey. In separate analyses, we measured strategic change 
over a three-year period, and the results presented below 
were substantively unchanged. 
Change scores, when used as dependent variables, can yield 
biased coefficients if the independent variables are correlated 
with the initial state of the dependent variable (i.e., x, corre- 
lated with y, in the change score y2 - y1) (Allison, 1990; 
Edwards, 1995). In this case, however, correlations between 
the independent variables (i.e., advice-seeking interactions 
with managers at other companies) and the initial state of the 
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change variables (i.e., diversification in the prior period) are 
consistently nonsignificant at alpha = .10. Moreover, the dis- 
tribution of product market diversification and geographic 
diversification is stable from year t to year t+2. Under these 
circumstances, results using change scores can be less 
biased than results from the regressor-variable method for 
assessing change (i.e., regressing y2 on y, and the indepen- 
dent variables) (Kenny and Cohen, 1979; Allison, 1990). In 
any event, separate analyses showed that our hypothesized 
results are essentially the same using either approach. 
Control variables. Given that there are likely to be individual 
differences in CEOs' propensity to seek advice from other 
managers, we controlled for prior advice seeking in models 
of current advice seeking. The CEO survey included a sepa- 
rate set of questions about advice seeking in an earlier year 
(i.e., year t-2). CEOs were asked to assess the extent to 
which they sought advice on strategic issues from managers 
at other firms in that earlier year and to specify from whom 
they sought advice. Using responses to these questions, we 
developed measures of prior advice seeking that parallel the 
advice-seeking measures discussed above. In effect, these 
control variables help us to rule out potential sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity. The survey also included a mea- 
sure of CEO advice seeking from outside directors on the 
focal board. We did not include this measure as a control 
variable in the final models because prior research has shown 
that poor firm performance is not related to CEO advice 
seeking from outside directors (cf. Westphal, 1999); more- 
over, given that outside directors' beliefs and perspectives 
may already be reflected in the focal firm's current strategy, 
CEO advice seeking from outside directors that results from 
poor performance would not necessarily affect the likelihood 
of subsequent change. Separate analyses confirmed that 
advice seeking from outside directors was not significantly 
related to change in corporate strategy, and our hypothesized 
results were unchanged with this variable included in the 
models. 
We also controlled for the board's independence from man- 
agement in models of CEO advice seeking and strategic 
change. Monitoring and control by independent boards might 
prompt CEOs to search more expansively for information in 
the strategic decision-making process, and there is some 
prior evidence linking board independence to more frequent 
strategic change (e.g., Gibbs, 1993; Bergh, 1995). We exam- 
ined four sources of board independence that have been 
widely studied in the corporate governance literature (for 
reviews, see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Johnson, Daily, 
and Ellstrand, 1996): separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions, coded as 1 if different individuals occupied the 
CEO and board chair positions; the portion of the board 
appointed after the CEO, measured as the number of outside 
directors appointed during the CEO's tenure divided by the 
total number of outsiders; director ownership, measured as 
the percentage of total common equity owned by outside 
directors; and institutional investor ownership, measured as 
the percentage owned by pension funds, banks and trust 
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companies, savings and loans, mutual fund managers, and 
labor union funds. 
We controlled for CEO tenure in models of advice seeking, 
given that CEOs might have a greater need for strategic 
advice early in their tenure (Hambrick and Fukotomi, 1991). 
The composition of the CEO's advice network may also be 
affected by the total number of board appointments the CEO 
holds, or perhaps by the total number of friends the CEO has 
at other firms. In effect, CEOs' existing social networks may 
affect their opportunities to seek advice from managers with 
certain characteristics. We did not expect these network 
attributes to affect advice seeking independent of the control 
variables for prior advice seeking described above, however, 
and separate analyses confirmed that neither the number of 
board appointments held by the CEO nor a survey measure 
of total friendship ties independently predicted advice seek- 
ing in any of the models (i.e., when the control variable for 
prior advice seeking was included). 
Given evidence that large firms are more vulnerable to inertial 
tendencies (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997), we controlled 
for firm size in models of strategic change, with size mea- 
sured as log of sales. We also controlled for market-to-book 
value in models of strategic change, given that poor perfor- 
mance could influence strategic change independent of CEO 
advice seeking (Zajac and Shortell, 1989). Similarly, indepen- 
dent boards might help overcome inertial tendencies that 
would otherwise hinder strategic change, although there is 
mixed evidence about whether independent boards are more 
involved in strategic decision making (Finkelstein and Ham- 
brick, 1996). As a precaution, we controlled for sources of 
board independence in models of strategic change. Finally, 
we included industry dummy variables at the two-digit SIC 
code level in all models (to conserve space, coefficients for 
these variables are not reported). In separate analyses, we 
controlled for the average performance of competitors, and 
the findings were substantively unchanged. Control variables 
were measured in year t-1. 
Analysis 
We used negative binomial regression to estimate CEO 
advice seeking. Negative binomial models are suitable for 
estimating a count variable with overdispersion (Maddala, 
1983). In this case, the distribution of each of the advice- 
seeking measures is characterized by overdispersion (i.e., the 
variance exceeds the mean). As noted above, we controlled 
for advice seeking in the prior period, which can create serial 
correlation. To adjust for this, we specified prior advice seek- 
ing as an instrumental variable in the models (Greene, 1993). 
We used OLS regression to estimate change in corporate 
strategy. We expected that error terms from the models of 
different kinds of advice ties (friends, functionally similar oth- 
ers, and executives in the same industry) could be correlated. 
Thus, in separate models we estimated the advice-seeking 
models simultaneously using Zellner's seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUREG) (Greene, 1993). The results were nearly 
identical to results of the negative binomial models present- 
ed below because, with the exception of one control variable 
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(prior advice seeking), the independent variables are the 
same across models (i.e., when all models include the same 
independent variables, SUREG yields the same results as 
OLS). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and bivariate correla- 
tions. As shown in the table, on average, the CEOs in our 
sample sought strategic advice from executives at other 
firms approximately nine times during the prior year. The 
majority of these interactions were with executives who 
were tied to the CEO by friendship (74 percent) and who 
were similar to the CEO with respect to functional back- 
ground (59 percent) and industry of employment (75 per- 
cent). 
Table 3 reports results from the negative binomial regression 
analyses of the relationship between firm performance, as 
indicated by market-to-book value, and the intensity of advice 
seeking from other firm executives with the characteristics of 
interest. The findings provide some support for hypothesis 
la. As shown in the first column of table 3, CEOs of poorly 
performing firms, as indicated by relatively low market-to- 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 241) 
Independent variable* Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Market-to-book value .02 .58 
2. Portion of board .30 .25 -.01 
appointed after CEO 
3. Separate CEO and board .18 .39 .04 -.20 
chair positions 
4. Director ownership .05 .08 .10 -.26 .22 
5. Institutional investor ownership .34 .20 .08 -.04 .07 -.11 
6. CEO tenure 6.35 6.38 .05 .33 -.21 -.15 -.09 
7. Log of sales 8.41 1.14 .03 .03 -.04 -.04 .16 .11 
8. Advice seeking from: 
a. Managers with 3.64 5.25 .13 .10 -.14 -.05 .02 -.16 
dissimilar backgrounds 
b. Managers who are not friends 2.33 5.17 .19 .11 -.09 -.18 -.03 -.18 
c. Managers in a different industry 2.23 4.79 .21 .05 -.16 -.14 -.15 -.07 
9. Advice seeking from: 
a. Managers with similar backgrounds 5.34 7.39 -.23 -.16 .20 .04 .03 -.12 
b. Managers who are friends 6.67 8.12 -.17 -.13 .25 .07 .07 -.26 
c. Managers in the same industry 6.76 8.92 -.18 -.08 .20 .06 .11 -.19 
10. Change in product market diversification .04 .30 -.17 -.03 .14 -.04 .09 -.06 
11. Change in geographic diversification .03 .17 .01 .18 .06 .07 .01 -.04 
Independent variable* 7 8a 8b 8c 9a 9b 9c 10 
8. Advice seeking from: 
a. Managers with dissimilar backgrounds -.02 
b. Managers who are not friends .01 .26 
c. Managers in a different industry -.02 .29 .33 
9. Advice seeking from: 
a. Managers with similar backgrounds -.04 -.06 .01 -.04 
b. Managers who are friends -.02 -.03 -.04 .02 .25 
c. Managers in the same industry -.02 -.04 .02 -.07 .29 .32 
10. Change in product market diversification -.23 .08 .18 .20 -.21 -.27 -.18 
11. Change in geographic diversification -.20 .06 .22 .19 -.20 -.20 -.05 .13 
* To conserve space, statistics for prior advice-seeking variables are not included; means and standard deviations for 
these variables (and the correlations between them) were very similar to descriptive statistics for the current advice- 
seeking variables (data available from the authors). 
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Table 3 
Negative Binomial Regression Analyses of CEO Advice Seeking from Top Managers at Other Companies* 
Advice Tie Characteristic 
Similar Dissimilar Same Different 
Independent variable background background Friend Not friend industry industry 
(Low) Market-to-book .110" -.081 .181* -.172" .463" -.358* 
value (.047) (.070) (.078) (.066) (.186) (.160) 
(Low) Portion of board .218* -.293 .4400 -.321' .722 -.537 
appointed after CEO (.107) (.160) (.182) (.147) (.410) (.344) 
Separate CEO and .167" -.1950 .328w" -.120 .426* -.355* 
board chair positions (.053) (.079) (.091) (.073) (.208) (.176) 
Director ownership .532 -.549 .640 -1.01 8 1.558 -2.0310 
(.355) (.522) (.596) (.483) (1.227) (.890) 
Institutional investor .120 .094 .332 -.109 .897 -.967 
ownership (.146) (.219) (.245) (.201) (.503) (.499) 
CEO tenure -.007 -.014' -.022*" -.014" -.037" -.025 
(.004) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.014) (.013) 
Prior advice seeking .009" .016* .023"* .040" Q .049*" .045" 
(.003) (.007) (.005) (.007) (.012) (.011) 
Constant .627" 
.516? .630" .816w" 1.218* .816 (.147) (.234) (.248) (.219) (.580) (.517) 
Likelihood ratio X2 34.30*" 33.21 " 38.820" 71.96" 38.60" 42.74" 
p ? .05; " p 5 .01; 0" p < .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. * Standard errors are in parentheses. 
book value, manifest a greater propensity to rely on the 
advice of other firm executives with similar functional back- 
grounds than do CEOs of firms with relatively high perfor- 
mance. The results in the second column of the table, how- 
ever, indicate that poor performance does not significantly 
increase or decrease advice seeking from managers with dis- 
similar backgrounds. Results in columns three and four sup- 
port hypothesis 1 b: CEOs of poorly performing firms evi- 
dence an elevated tendency to seek advice from managers 
who are friends and a reduced tendency to rely on the advice 
of executives who they indicated were not friends, compared 
with CEOs of firms with relatively high performance. More- 
over, the results are consistent with hypothesis 1c, which 
predicted that CEOs of poorly performing firms would report 
both a greater reliance on the advice of other executives in 
the same industry and a lesser reliance on those in different 
industries than would CEOs of firms with relatively high per- 
formance. Not surprisingly, separate analyses showed that 
the main effects of low firm performance on the overall level 
of CEO advice seeking were generally not significant. Firm 
performance was only consistently significant in predicting 
the attributes of the CEOs' advice contacts, in terms of 
greater or less advice seeking from executives who have (or 
do not have) friendship ties to the CEO, and advice seeking 
from executives who are similar vs. dissimilar to the CEO. 
Table 4 reports results of analyses relevant to the predictions 
in hypotheses 2a-2c. H2a predicted that higher levels of CEO 
advice seeking from executives of other firms who have a 
functional background similar to the CEO would be negatively 
associated with subsequent change in corporate strategy, 
while advice seeking from executives who have a different 
functional background would be positively associated with 
such change. Results in table 4 generally support this hypoth- 
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Table 4 
OLS Regression Analyses of Change in Corporate Strategy* 
Change in product Change in 
Independent variable market diversification geographic diversification 
Advice seeking from: 
Mgrs. with similar backgrounds -.008" -.0030 
(.003) (.002) 
Mgrs. who are friends -. 100"" -.060*" 
(.032) (.018) 
Mgrs. in the same industry -.011 " -.006W 
(.004) (.002) 
Mgrs. with dissimilar backgrounds .008* .003 
(.004) (.002) 
Mgrs. who are not friends .044" .033*" 
(.018) (.010) 
Mgrs. in a different industry 
.010? .004 (.005) (.003) 
Log of sales -.045" -.031" 
(.017) (.010) 
(Low) Market-to-book value .074' -.007 
(.036) (.020) 
(Low) Portion of board appointed .019 
.090? 
after CEO (.078) (.045) 
Separate CEO and board chair .072 .036 
positions (.041) (.023) 
Director ownership -.143 .205 
(.275) (.155) 
Institutional investor ownership .170 .036 
(.111) (.062) 
(Low) Market-to-book x
Advice seeking from : 
Mgrs. with similar backgrounds -.015" -.0090 
(.006) (.004) 
Mgrs. who are friends -.051 -.031 "* 
(.018) (.010) 
Mgrs. in the same industry -.015 -.002 
(.009) (.002) 
Mgrs. with dissimilar backgrounds .008* .013" 
(.004) (.005) 
Mgrs. who are not friends .044" .033" 
(.018) (.013) 
Mgrs. in a different industry .011 .012* 
(.005) (.006) 
Constant -.621 .034 
(.477) (.269) 
F 2.92" 2.75" 
R2 .67 .64 
p < .05; 
" p < .01; " p ? .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. * Standard errors are in parentheses. 
esis. Advice seeking from executives with a similar functional 
background is negatively associated with subsequent change 
in either product market diversification or geographic diversifi- 
cation, while advice seeking from executives with a different 
functional background is positively associated with subse- 
quent change in product market diversification (but not asso- 
ciated with change in geographic diversification). Moreover, 
these independent variables moderate the effect of prior firm 
performance on strategic change: the effect of relatively low 
performance on change becomes significantly more negative (less positive) as advice seeking from executives with a simi- 
lar background increases and advice seeking from executives 
with a different background decreases, for both kinds of 
diversification. 
19/ASQ, March 2003 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:03:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Further, results provide strong support for H2b. Higher levels 
of CEO advice seeking from executives of other firms with 
whom the CEO shares personal friendship ties are negatively 
associated with subsequent change in product market diver- 
sification or geographic diversification. In addition, advice 
seeking from executives with whom the CEO does not have 
friendship ties is positively associated with subsequent 
change in both dimensions of corporate strategy. Moreover, 
these advice-seeking variables moderate the effect of prior 
firm performance on strategic change. The effect of relatively 
low performance on change becomes significantly more neg- 
ative (less positive) as advice seeking from executives who 
are friends of the CEO increases and advice seeking from 
executives who are not friends of the CEO decreases. Again, 
these results hold for both kinds of diversification. 
The results provide some support for H2c. CEOs' advice 
seeking from managers at other firms in the same industry is 
negatively associated with subsequent change in both kinds 
of diversification. Advice seeking from managers in a differ- 
ent industry is positively related to change in product market 
diversification and unrelated to change in geographic diversifi- 
cation. Moreover, there is some evidence that advice seeking 
from managers in the same vs. different industries moder- 
ates the effect of prior firm performance on strategic change: 
the effect of relatively low performance on change in product 
market diversification or geographic diversification becomes 
significantly more negative (less positive) as advice seeking 
from executives who are in a different industry decreases. 
The moderating effect of advice seeking from executives in 
the same industry is significant for product market diversifica- 
tion at alpha = .10 and insignificant for geographic diversifica- 
tion. Overall, the findings support our contention that greater 
advice seeking from managers at other firms has a more 
negative effect on strategic change to the extent that it 
involves the CEOs' friends or similar others. Moreover, the 
findings generally suggest that CEOs' advice ties moderate 
the effects of firm performance on strategic change. Rela- 
tively low firm performance is less likely to prompt strategic 
change to the extent that CEOs seek advice from managers 
at other firms with whom they have the specified social con- 
nections and do not seek advice from managers with whom 
they lack such connections.' 
We also tested whether the advice-tie variables mediated the 
effects of low firm performance on strategic change. We 
adapted the procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and Sobel (1982) to estimate the joint indirect effects 
of the exogenous variable on strategic change through the 
advice-tie variables. The test determines, for instance, 
whether the six possible indirect effects of low market-to- 
book value on change in diversification (i.e., effects through 
each of the advice-tie variables) are simultaneously zero. This 
test showed that the CEO advice-tie variables, taken as a 
whole, significantly mediated the effect of low market-to- 
book value on change in product market diversification (z = 
2.33) and change in geographic diversification (z = 2.15). That 
is, low firm performance had a negative effect on both kinds 
of strategic change through CEOs' advice seeking. Overall, 
I 
We checked for multicollinearity in the 
models. The highest variance inflation fac- 
tor (VIF) was less than ten in all models, 
and the mean VIF was not considerably 
greater than one in any of the models, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
problem (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 
2000). Moreover, bivariate correlations 
between the three kinds of affinity ties 
ranged from .25 to .31, which supports 
our implicit assumption that friendship 
ties, functional background similarity, and 
employment in the same industry are 
related but distinct constructs. This 
assumption is further supported both by 
results of the SUREG models noted 
above, which showed that the effects of 
prior performance on particular advice-tie 
variables hold up after controlling for the 
effects of performance on the other 
dependent variables, and by evidence 
that the advice-seeking variables have 
independent effects on strategic change. 
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the results indicate that CEOs' advice seeking from execu- 
tives at other firms both mediates and moderates the effects 
of relatively poor firm performance on strategic change. That 
is, lower firm performance indirectly leads to less strategic 
change through greater CEO advice seeking from friends and 
similar others and less advice seeking from executives with 
whom the CEO lacks such connections. At the same time, 
the effect of relatively low performance on strategic change 
becomes significantly less positive (more negative) as advice 
seeking from executives who are friends, who manage com- 
panies in the same industry, or who have a similar back- 
ground increases, and advice seeking from executives with 
whom the CEO lacks such connections decreases. As noted 
above, this general pattern of results also emerged when 
performance was measured as return on assets. 
Reverse causality. We addressed the potential for reverse 
causality in the relationship between prior performance and 
CEO advice seeking in three ways. First, as noted above, we 
controlled for CEOs' advice seeking in the prior period in esti- 
mating these relationships.2 Second, supplementary analyses 
of firm performance discussed below and displayed in the 
Appendix show that advice seeking in time t (e.g., 1998) 
does not influence firm performance in time t+1 or time t+2 
(1999 or 2000), providing further evidence that reverse 
causality does not explain the observed relationships 
between prior performance and CEO advice seeking lagged 
by one year.3 
Given these analyses, reverse causality could only occur if 
the relationship between prior performance and advice seek- 
ing were confounded by advice seeking prior to time t-l, 
since we control for advice seeking in the prior period. This 
seems highly unlikely, as it would require earlier advice seek- 
ing (e.g., at time t-3) to predict performance at the end of 
time t-1, independent of advice seeking in time t-1, and 
advice seeking in time t-3 to predict advice seeking in time t, 
again independent of advice seeking in time t-1. In any event, 
we used data from a more recent survey of advice seeking to 
conduct an analysis that replicates the effect of prior perfor- 
mance on advice seeking after controlling for advice seeking 
in multiple prior time periods (i.e., prior to time t-1). The more 
recent survey sample overlaps partially with the earlier sur- 
vey sample and includes the same advice-seeking questions. 
Using the more recent data, we estimated the effect of per- 
formance at the end of 2000 on advice seeking in 2001, after 
controlling for advice seeking in 1998 (t-3) and advice seeking 
in 1997 (t-4) (N = 123). The relationships between (low) prior 
performance and CEO advice seeking were significant, as 
expected, for five of the six dependent variables. This analy- 
sis not only provides further evidence that reverse causality 
does not explain our results, but it also replicates evidence 
for hypothesis 1 in a later time period. 
Performance consequences. We also examined the possi- 
ble implications of our theoretical perspective for firm perfor- 
mance. To the extent that CEOs' advice seeking in response 
to poor performance reflects affirmation-seeking tendencies 
rather than an unbiased search for objective input, as our the- 
ory would suggest, the advice seeking that results from poor 
2 
Separate analyses also confirmed that the 
hypothesized results held up after control- 
ling for all advice-seeking variables in the 
prior period, for example, in estimating 
advice seeking from managers who are 
friends, controlling for prior advice seek- 
ing from managers with similar back- 
grounds and managers in the same indus- 
try, as well as prior advice seeking from 
friends. 
3 
Separate analyses also showed that 
advice seeking in time t-1 (1997) does not 
influence firm performance in time t or 
time t+l. 
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prior performance could have negative implications for subse- 
quent firm performance. To test this supposition, we 
regressed market-to-book value on the advice-seeking vari- 
ables with lags of one to four years. We corrected for serial 
correlation by specifying prior market-to-book value as an 
instrumental variable in the models (Greene, 1993). Results 
are displayed in the Appendix. They show that advice seeking 
from friends and similar others generally has negative effects 
on subsequent firm performance lagged by three or four 
years (both as main effects and interacted with prior perfor- 
mance), while advice seeking from acquaintances and dissim- 
ilar others generally has positive effects on these variables. 
Based on examination of simple effects and visual inspection 
of graphical representations of the interactions, these effects 
can be interpreted as showing that when prior firm perfor- 
mance is relatively low, advice seeking from friends and simi- 
lar others is negatively related to subsequent performance 
(lagged three or four years) (i.e., poorly performing firms are 
less likely to improve and more likely to get worse); when 
prior firm performance is relatively high, advice seeking has 
weaker effects on subsequent performance. 
Moreover, the results suggest that change in diversification 
mediates these effects, as the effects of advice seeking gen- 
erally became nonsignificant when the strategic change vari- 
ables were included in the models (columns four and six of 
table A.1). We also conducted the Sobel (1982) test of media- 
tion (see prior discussion), which confirmed that the advice- 
tie variables had indirect effects on firm performance through 
strategic change. Thus, the results suggest that advice seek- 
ing from friends and similar others has negative effects on 
firm performance by increasing strategic inertia, particularly 
when prior performance is relatively low. As we would 
expect, the advice-tie variables do not influence firm perfor- 
mance lagged by one or two years, since it presumably takes 
more than two years for advice seeking to influence strategic 
decisions and then for those decisions to have an impact on 
firm performance (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). We discuss 
the implications of these supplementary results below. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, results from our analyses provide substantial support 
for the specific predictions derived from our theoretical 
framework. The first set of findings indicated that relatively 
poor performance increases the tendency for CEOs of poorly 
performing firms to rely on the advice of executives from 
other firms with whom they share functional backgrounds, 
friendship ties, and industry of employment, while decreasing 
the tendency for CEOs to rely on the advice of executives 
with whom they lack these connections. These findings sup- 
port our theoretical perspective, which suggested that rela- 
tively poor performance would reduce CEOs' sense of cer- 
tainty about the validity of their strategy-related beliefs and 
that this uncertainty would increase CEOs' tendencies to 
identify with executives with whom they shared social ties or 
a common professional background. Our theory further indi- 
cated that these increased tendencies toward social identifi- 
cation would heighten CEOs' susceptibilities to a number of 
positive biases in their perceptions of these in-group member 
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executives and that these biases would ultimately be mani- 
fested in high levels of strategic advice seeking from man- 
agers who are socially similar to or share social ties with the 
CEO and lower levels of advice seeking from managers with 
whom the CEO lacks such connections. 
The second set of findings showed that greater CEO advice 
seeking from executives with whom the CEO shares func- 
tional backgrounds, friendship ties, or industry of employ- 
ment and less advice seeking from executives with whom 
the CEO lacks these connections have the effect of reducing 
subsequent change in the focal firm's corporate strategy in 
response to poor firm performance. These results also sup- 
port our theory, which drew on social psychological and 
social network research suggesting that executives from 
other firms with whom a CEO shared the specified social ties 
or common background characteristics would be more likely 
than executives with whom a CEO lacked such social con- 
nections to affirm his or her strategy-related beliefs. Our the- 
ory further suggested that high levels of affirming advice and 
low levels of non-affirming advice would serve to restore 
CEOs' sense of certainty about their strategic beliefs and that 
this increased sense of certainty would ultimately lead them 
to pursue relatively low levels of strategic change in 
response to firm performance problems. 
A central contribution of these findings is that they demon- 
strate how micro-social factors can influence firms' respons- 
es to economic adversity and, more specifically, how execu- 
tives' social network ties can contribute to strategic inertia in 
response to relatively poor firm performance. While research 
in a variety of management literatures has addressed the role 
of cognitive factors, including managerial attribution biases 
and restricted information processing activity, in firms' fail- 
ures to change strategies in response to performance prob- 
lems, less research has examined how the social network 
ties of top executives can help explain strategic inertia (Staw, 
Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; Whetten, 1987; Sutton, 1990; 
Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Our theory and supportive find- 
ings suggest that shifts in the pattern of CEOs' advice seek- 
ing in response to relatively low firm performance (i.e., seek- 
ing higher levels of advice from friends and similar others and 
lower levels of advice from acquaintances and dissimilar oth- 
ers) may exacerbate the executive biases or "perceptual dis- 
tortions" that have been implicated in cases of strategic iner- 
tia (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1978: 113). Thus, our 
study may offer a new perspective on why organizational 
turnarounds are often difficult to achieve. 
Additional findings on the ultimate performance conse- 
quences of this pattern of CEO advice seeking showed that 
when prior firm performance is relatively low, advice seeking 
from friends and similar others is negatively related to subse- 
quent performance, and these effects are mediated by lack 
of change in diversification strategy. These results are again 
consistent with our theoretical perspective, which suggests 
that CEO advice seeking in response to poor performance 
reflects a search for affirmation of the CEO's strategic beliefs 
rather than an unbiased search for objective input on the 
firm's current strategy. As a result, CEO advice seeking in 
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response to relatively low performance should decrease the 
likelihood of needed changes in corporate strategy, resulting 
in lower subsequent performance. The results support this 
implication of our theory. It appears that poorly performing 
firms are ultimately less likely to improve and more likely to 
get worse as a result of CEOs' seeking advice from execu- 
tives at other firms. These supplementary findings further 
suggest the potential role of executive social networks in 
organizational decline and downward performance spirals. 
While prior theorizing has emphasized the role of managerial 
biases and misperceptions in such downward spirals (e.g., 
Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1978; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 
1988; D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Lindsley, Brass, and 
Thomas, 1995), our theory and findings suggest how CEOs' 
social network ties could ultimately contribute to patterns of 
organizational decline. 
Moreover, our findings contribute to research on interorgani- 
zational networks. While substantial research attention has 
been given to the impact of interorganizational relationships 
on theoretically important strategic outcomes (Mizruchi, 
1996; Gulati, 1998), relatively little attention has been paid to 
the general role of interorganizational ties in processes of 
strategic adaptation and inertia (Kraatz, 1998). Further, this 
paper potentially contributes to our understanding of the 
determinants and consequences of informal network ties 
between firms. The bulk of prior research on interorganiza- 
tional relationships and their strategic consequences has 
focused on the implications of formal links between firms 
(e.g., board interlocks or strategic alliances), while inferring or 
simply not specifying the role of informal links such as advice 
or friendship ties (cf. Ingram and Roberts, 2000). The findings 
reported here provide direct evidence of profound, systemat- 
ic effects of informal interfirm network ties on important 
strategic outcomes. 
While recent research in the growing literature on social 
embeddedness has focused on the benefits of informal 
social ties between managers of different firms, our findings 
suggest that certain kinds of informal ties, such as the advice 
ties CEOs tap in response to relatively poor performance, can 
have negative consequences for strategic decision making 
and ultimate firm performance. At the same time, our results 
are not inconsistent with studies suggesting that informal 
social ties, such as friendship ties between executives of dif- 
ferent firms, can have beneficial performance consequences 
for firms (cf. Uzzi, 1996, 1999; Ingram and Roberts, 2000). 
CEOs' friendship ties to executives of other firms can 
increase access to resources and facilitate problem solving in 
exchange relationships; moreover, trust and understanding 
between friends can facilitate the exchange of tacit or com- 
plex information, with potential benefits for product innova- 
tion (Hansen, 1999), mitigation of competitive behavior (e.g., 
Perry, 1998; Ingram and Roberts, 2000), and ultimately firm 
survival (Uzzi, 1996). These benefits of informal social ties 
can coexist with the effects of seeking advice from friends 
that we observed in our study. Thus, for instance, a CEO may 
have social ties that provide advice that affirms the CEO's 
current strategy despite performance problems, thus pre- 
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venting needed strategic changes, while at the same time 
having friendship ties to suppliers and buyers that improve 
the quality of the firm's exchange relationships. Moreover, 
the advice interactions examined in this study, which concern 
the focal firm's corporate strategy, generally do not require an 
exchange of tacit or complex information. As noted above, 
our survey indicated that a large portion of CEOs' advice 
interactions with executives of other firms called for opinions 
related to the suitability of the focal firm's corporate strategy, 
for example, affirming or not affirming the appropriateness of 
a diversification strategy. Managers may still have other infor- 
mal communications with colleagues at other firms that pro- 
vide more tacit and/or complex information that facilitates 
innovation or other aspects of strategy implementation 
(Kraatz, 1998). 
Our social psychological perspective on how executives react 
to poor firm performance should help advance theoretical 
perspectives on the psychological mechanisms that shape 
managers' behavioral responses to economic adversity. 
Threat-rigidity theory highlights the cognitive implications of 
the individual-level stress effects of poor performance as 
grounding for its basic thesis that performance-induced anxi- 
ety provokes rigidity in organizational behavior (Staw, Sande- 
lands, and Dutton, 1981). Consistent with recent insights 
from self-categorization theory (Hogg and Terry, 2000), our 
theory and supportive findings suggest the complementary 
view that executives' efforts to reduce their feelings of sub- 
jective uncertainty play a notable role in their behavioral adap- 
tations to economic adversity. Our theory further specifies 
how these efforts to reduce uncertainty are manifested in 
changes in patterns of social interaction. In particular, the 
findings are consistent with our theoretical argument that rel- 
atively low performance leads to the observed pattern of 
CEO advice seeking, in large part, because such advice seek- 
ing helps to alleviate subjective uncertainty provoked by poor 
firm performance. Thus, our study suggests how threat rigidi- 
ty effects can be explained from contemporary social psycho- 
logical theory, which emphasizes the socio-cognitive process- 
es of subjective uncertainty reduction-rather than stress or 
anxiety reduction or self-esteem enhancement-as a primary 
driver of social interaction. This perspective dovetails with 
contemporary social network theory, which highlights uncer- 
tainty reduction as a primary consequence of network 
embeddedness (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). 
As noted previously, research on group processes has shown 
that in-group identification, or the degree to which an individ- 
ual identifies with members of a salient in-group, can be 
influenced by both group-level factors, such as a common 
threat (Sherif, 1966; Pettigrew, 1998), and individual-level fac- 
tors like subjective uncertainty (Hogg and Mullin, 1999). In 
this study, we examined an individual-level determinant of in- 
group identification, while using control variables and supple- 
mentary analyses to rule out the possibility that the results 
reflect such "group-level" (i.e., industry-level) factors. For 
instance, one might interpret an empirical relationship 
between poor firm performance and CEOs' seeking advice 
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from executives in the same industry as suggesting that 
when executives are experiencing a common, industry-level 
threat (manifested as low performance), they become more 
cohesive and cooperative in dealing with that threat, mani- 
fested as increased advice seeking among executives in the 
same industry, who are also more likely to be friends and to 
have similar functional backgrounds. This interaction might 
then facilitate strategic cooperation, ultimately benefiting the 
CEOs' firms. Our analyses rule out this interpretation in two 
ways: (1) the models include industry dummy variables to 
capture the effects of threats and opportunities peculiar to 
particular industries, and separate analyses showed that the 
results were unchanged when we controlled for the average 
performance of competitors, which would capture the extent 
to which a focal firm's performance problems indicated a col- 
lective threat; and (2) evidence that advice seeking from 
executives in the same industry has negative effects on firm 
performance by increasing strategic inertia is not consistent 
with the interpretation that CEO advice seeking from friends 
and similar others in response to poor performance reflects 
beneficial in-group cohesion and strategic cooperation in the 
face of a collective threat. 
From a methodological perspective, our analysis is based on 
a unique dataset that includes survey data on the advice con- 
tacts of top managers from a large sample of firms. While 
few prior studies have collected data on the advice-seeking 
propensities or other social behaviors of top managers, very 
little if any large-sample research has collected systematic 
data on the identities of top managers' network contacts. We 
were able to collect these data with an adequate response 
rate, and we were able to survey individuals who were listed 
as advice contacts by primary respondents to assess inter- 
rater reliability. We hope that the success of this empirical 
effort will encourage further research on the social network 
ties of top executives. 
While this study has provided initial evidence for our perspec- 
tive on how performance outcomes affect advice-seeking 
behavior, and the ultimate consequences for organizational 
change in the context of corporate strategy, future research 
could further test and develop our theoretical perspective in 
several ways. Although we examined the effects of CEO 
advice seeking on change in product market diversification 
and geographic diversification, our analysis does not address 
all possible changes in strategy that could be influenced by 
informal executive networks. Further research could examine 
the effects of CEOs' network ties on change in firms' coop- 
erative strategies, such as the propensity to form strategic 
alliances and joint ventures, in response to poor perfor- 
mance. Research might also investigate how executives' 
social networks influence the effects of poor performance on 
change in firms' competitive strategy with respect to the 
speed and form of firms' competitive moves. Moreover, 
while our theoretical perspective has focused on an individ- 
ual-level determinant of CEO advice seeking, subjective 
uncertainty, and the consequences for strategic inertia, future 
studies could examine group-level determinants of execu- 
tives' social network ties and strategic decision making. 
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There is some theory and evidence to suggest that in-group 
identification in response to a collective threat may result in 
more adaptive behavior by group members (e.g., Sherif, 
1966). Compared with poor individual-level performance, a 
collective threat may be less ego-threatening to executives 
and thus more likely to prompt an objective search for solu- 
tions rather than affirmation-seeking behavior by executives. 
Future research might also examine whether and how eco- 
nomic adversity influences CEOs' advice seeking from inside 
directors on the focal board. Inside directors may tend to 
affirm the CEO's judgment on strategic issues, either as an 
act of deference to the CEO or because they worked togeth- 
er with the CEO in formulating the current strategy and thus 
share the CEO's psychological and reputational commitment 
to the strategy. Accordingly, seeking advice from inside direc- 
tors could reinforce the effects of seeking advice from execu- 
tives outside the firm in promoting strategic inertia in 
response to economic adversity. 
Our theoretical framework could perhaps also be extended to 
explain the consequences of negative performance feedback 
at lower levels of the organization. Our theory would sug- 
gest, for instance, that managers of divisions, project teams, 
or other groups in an organization that experience failures or 
otherwise receive negative performance feedback might 
change their pattern of seeking advice from managers in 
other units of the organization in ways that may impede 
learning and adaptation, seeking more advice from strong vs. 
weak ties or similar vs. dissimilar others. Thus, social psycho- 
logical perspectives on self-categorization and belief affirma- 
tion could point to new directions for research on social net- 
works and change in organizations. 
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Table A.1 
OLS Regression Analyses of Firm Performance* 
Three-year lag Four-year lag 
Independent variable One-year lag Two-year lag Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Advice seeking from: 
Mgrs. with similar -.005 -.007 -.016" -.004 
-.010? -.004 
backgrounds (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Mgrs. who are friends -.025 -.025 -.059*** -.025 -.053" -.035 
(.016) (.016) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Mgrs. in same industry .003 -.005 -.020* -.011 -.018* -.008 
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Mgrs. with dissimilar .005 .011 .021* .010 .022" .013 
backgrounds (.007) (.007) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.009) 
Mgrs. who are not friends .026 .033 .060" .026 .055" .029 
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.024) (.023) (.023) 
Mgrs. in different industry .014 .010 .017 .012 
.019? .002 (.009) (.009) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.011) 
(Low) market-to-book -.752" -.600*" -.588" -.405" -.4220" -.3070" 
(.078) (.077) (.092) (.093) (.090) (.090) 
(Low) Market-to-book x
Advice seeking from: 
Mgrs. with similar -.015 -.010 -.0330 -.019 -.033" -.018 
backgrounds (.012) (.012) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Mgrs. who are friends -.017 -.049 -.1320" -.0730 -.112" -.031 
(.034) (.034) (.040) (.041) (.039) (.039) 
Mgrs. in same industry -.024 -.031 -.027 -.004 -.023 -.021 
(.018) (.017) (.021) (.021) (.020) (.020) 
Mgrs. with dissimilar .010 .020 .0420 .016 .049" .013 
backgrounds (.015) (.015) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Mgrs. who are not friends .056 .046 .085* .074 
.093? .026 (.042) (.041) (.049) (.049) (.048) (.048) 
Mgrs. in different industry .018 .030 .061" .023 .053" .0460 
(.019) (.019) (.022) (.023) (.022) (.022) 
Change in product market .733*" .623*" 
diversification (.152) (.149) 
Change in geographic .889" .895*" 
diversification (.265) (.259) 
Log of sales -.043 -.036 -.057 -.024 -.046 -.030 
(.033) (.032) (.039) (.039) (.038) (.038) 
Institutional ownership .267 .318 .407 .403 .290 .332 
(.186) (.186) (.221) (.223) (.216) (.217) 
Constant -.250 .051 .561 .355 .434 .328 
(.320) (.317) (.379) (.362) (.371) (.349) 
F 14.29*" 10.16" 14.340" 14.59*" 13.59" 13.96" 
R2 .47 .38 .51 .54 .48 .50 
Sp .05; 
" p! .01; " p .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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